expiration of franchises since it was seldom clear how the city should gain control and how much compensation the priyate entrepreneur should 1 receive.
The history of mass transit operations in Toronto reveals a rather interesting intermixture of the attitudes towards ownership that had been evolving elsewhere. Nor did attitudes remain constant over time, and these shifting perceptions of public involvement in mass transit provide the major focus for this paper. In 1861, for example, when the first horsecars were introduced to the city, Toronto followed the example set in U.S. cities. The horsecars were seen not as a public utility but as a novelty, and the rights to their operation were handed over to private entrepreneurs in the form of a thirty-year monopolistic franchise. The city did regulate the fare structure (five cents) and some aspects of the operation of the horsecars (for example, hours of service) and it did tax the company 1 s revenues, but in typical North American fashion the question of what was to happen when the franchise expired was not clearly spelled out. Instead, there was considerable bickering over the cash value of the utility as the first franchise drew to a close. By 1891 mass transit had become an essential part of life to many Torontonians. Some even advocated municipal ownership of the utility, and the horsecars were operated by the municipality while the civic leaders deliberated upon a course of action.
Public ownership, however, proved to be too radical a step for most of Toronto's leading politicians and businessmen in 1891. In spite of the poor service provided by the private company during the last years of its franchise, most civic leaders still felt that transit had to be John P. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: The Rise of Urban Mass Transport in Europe (Princeton, 1976) . See also G. Smerk, "The Streetcar: Shaper of American Cities," Traffic Quarterly, XXI (1967) , 569-584; and G. R. Taylor, "The Beginnings of Mass Transit in Urban America," in J. F. Richardson (éd.), The American City: Historical Studies (Waltham, 1972) , 125-157. operated on strict business principles.
Torontonians still had to learn about the drawbacks of private ownership through experience.
Another three decades under this system was a more than sufficient period for the education of the riding public.
The second street railway franchise, also for thirty years, was let to William Mackenzie and his associates in the Toronto Railway
Company (TRC). Mackenzie was probably the greatest Canadian steam and electric railway magnate of his time, with interests that included the vast Canadian Northern Railway (later to become the Canadian National Railway) and other rail lines, along with street railway and electric power companies in such diverse places as Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Alberta, Mexico, and Brazil. In the TRC, as is most of his ventures, Mackenzie 3 was joined by contractor Donald Mann.
A third important TRC official was Robert John Fleming, a former mayor of Toronto, who joined the firm 4 in 1905 as General Manager.
It was often the "astute and affable 11 R.J., overseer of the day-to-day operations of the TRC, who bore the brunt of the criticism levellled against the company.
According to a recent analysis by historians Armstrong and Nelles, the primary reason for the granting of the franchise to the TRC See Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, "The Un-Bluing of Toronto and the Revenge of the Methodist Bicycle Company: The Fight over Sunday Street Cars, 1891-1898," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Kingston, 1973 . For other discussions of the early transit history of Toronto see Harald Moras, "A Study of the Development of the Public Transportation System in the City of Toronto from 1861 to 1921," unpublished B.C. thesis, Department of Geography, University of Toronto, 1970, 43; and Louis H. Pursley, Street Railways of Toronto, 1861 -1921 , Interurbans, special volume No. 25 (Los Angeles, 1958 3 An Encyclopaedia of Canadian Biography, II (Montreal and Toronto, 1905) , 21-2; John F. Due, The Intercity Electric Railway Industry in Canada (Toronto, 1966), 14, 82-7; and Pursley, Street Railways, 153. 4 J.E. Middleton, The Municipality of Toronto. A History, 3 vols. (Toronto, 1923) Reports (1905 Reports ( , 1906 Reports ( , 1908 Reports ( -1920 Ibid., 69.
16
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Privy Council in London, without success. The decision of the latter body, rendered in September of 1909, was unequivocal: the City had neither the right to prevent the TRC from making extensions within the 1891 city limits, nor the right to force the company to make them in the outlying districts.
Years had been wasted in this legal battle, and, as a result, it was not until 1912 that the TRC was able 18 to complete its desired downtown improvements.
Delays of this nature were to become increasingly characteristic as the years passed.
None of the judicial decisions of this period did anything to provide improved transit facilities for the residents of Toronto Both companies had been purchased by the MackenzieMann interests in 1904, and it seems highly likely that the TRC decision of that year not to extend streetcar service beyond the 1891 city limits 21 was related to this purchase.
No attempt was ever made by Mackenzie and Mann to integrate the operation of the radiais with that of the TRC, 22 even though they followed the opposite policy in Winnipeg and Vancouver.
Those radial sections within Toronto's boundaries generally passed through the densest parts of the city The Radial Railways on North Yonge Street," Upper Canada Railway Society Newsletter, No. 326 (March/April, 1973, 44-58. 21 Reported in Railway and Shipping World, VII (August, 1904) tracks, more cars, more speed." Much of the failure of the street railway company apparently related to its economic policies:
it is paying to its owners a liberal return, and building up a large reserve fund. The crux of the situation, so far as present service is concerned, is that instead of this reserve fund being spent on the property to maintain it in condition to give adequate service, it has been 'distributed in the form of extra dividends, or is being allowed to accumulate, presumably for the purpose of protecting the securities outstanding against the property at the time of the expiration of the present franchise. 25
The shortage of cars and the operation of the system also troubled Arnold. In short, the Toronto system did not measure up to street car facilities in U.S. cities of similar size. In comparison with Washington, New Orleans, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo, Seattle, and We find ourselves with a monopoly of the surface transportation in the hands of a company enfranchised twenty-two years ago, upon such terms as make it impossible for the municipal administration to economically or satisfactorily provide transportation for nearly one-half of the present area of the City. This company has a franchise terminating eight years hence, with no inducement to maintain an efficient service, but with every reason from the standpoint of the shareholders to deteriorate both the service and the equipment. I believe that I am within the mark when I say that hardly a single thoughtful citizen expects from the present company reasonable consideration of their needs during the remaining period of the franchise. 31
To be on the safe side, the Mayor sent the valuations of the Council that I have . . . consulted with our Treasurer and taken counsel with other financiers as to the probabilities of the duration of the war, and the possibility of floating bonds for such a purpose at the conclusion of hostilities. I am advised that, even should the war end in six or nine months, the financial market will be in such a condition that it will be impossible to secure the funds necessary except at an exorbitant rate of interest.... In view of all the circumstances, therefore, I suggest to the Council that the negotiations for the acquisition of these properties be discontinued.38
Council approved the Mayor's suggestion on October 5th and the 'pur-39 chase deal 1 episode drew to a close. More than a year had been consumed in negotiating the agreement. Quite naturally, few improvements had been made to the transit system during this interval, and when the negotiations were terminated, the joint prospects of war and renewed bickering over the details of the street railway franchise did not bode well for a rapid solution to Toronto's transportation difficulties.
In the meantime developments had taken place on other fronts.
After the judicial setbacks of 1909, the City had waited until 1911 before it again did battle with the TRC in the courts. In November of that year, the Corporation came before the ORMB to present a list of alleged franchise defaults by the company and defects in the service provided. At the head of the list was the overcrowding issue, and the City used the findings of Arnold's report to substantiate 38
Ibid., Appendix C, 115-6. 39
Ibid., Minutes, 425.
its case. Since this study had dealt with an area that was considerably larger than the corporate limits of Toronto, the OKMB decided to commission its own investigations into transit conditions within the city proper. For this purpose, the services of C.R.
Barnes, a man with 20 years experience as the Electric Railway Expert of the New York State Public Service Commission, were engaged. Barnes 40 presented his report to the ORMB on May 15, 1914.
Basically, his findings corresponded to those of Arnold, and the members of the ORMB reacted favourably to the findings of the Barnes Report turning its 41 seventeen specific recommendations into direct orders to the company.
For the most part, the TRC either ignored the Board's orders completely or else employed the excuse that due to the war the company could not obtain the necessary resources for it to comply with the ORMB 1 s directives. Yet company profits remained respectable even during the war years (Table 1 ). In 1917, the City requested that the ORMB force the TRC to comply with the Board's original orders. The company again refused to provide more cars and in 1918, the ORMB levied a fine of $24,000 against the TRC. This was a small price to pay compared to 42 the cost of the 200 streetcars that the Board had ordered built.
Once again prolonged litigation had failed to bring relief to the transit-riding public. (Toronto, 1914) . This came to be known simply as the Barnes Report.
41
Barnes Report, [196] [197] [198] . The extensions were to be on 1) Wilton (later Dundas Street) and Pape Avenues, 2) Terauley (later Bay) Street, 3) Bloor Street West, 4) Harbord Street, and 5) Dupont Street. See also ORMB, Tenth Annual Report (Toronto, 1916) Telegram interview the people have given me an excellent expression of their opinion of the neferious street railway company and have shown for all time to come that they will have no patience with such dealings with the street railway company to which they have been subjected to for the past two years. ^ There would be no deals between the Mackenzie-Mann company and the new Mayor and, since Church occupied that office until 1921, no real peace on Toronto's transit scene until after the public take-over of that year.
From the outset, Tommy Church gave every indication that he would be a man of action, willing to take the transit bull by the horns. In his inaugural address to Council he noted that it is true that the purchase agreement and negotiations are of the past, hut the problem of the street railway and its inefficient and insufficient service is still with us and must be solved. There is only one possible policy now before the people, and that is fast traction.^6 The transit utility was increasingly coming to be viewed as a necessary part of Toronto life, something that could no longer be left to the whims of 48 private capital.
As the Mayor's transit investigators noted:
The future growth and development of the City of Toronto will be largely dependent upon the provision of adequate transportation facilities, properly located. Church's midnight theatrics, and, at one point, more than 700 of the 54 vehicles plied that thoroughfare.
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Evening Telegram, June 26, 1915, 8 . This hill forms part of the ancient shoreline of glacial Lake Iroquois. In spite of the noticeable relief that jitneys brought to the Yonge Street gap and other parts of the city, civic officials greeted the cars with mixed feelings. The police commission, with the support of City Council, enacted a very stiff set of regulations to control the 55 operation of these vehicles.
The daily press strongly attacked such measures, with the Globe noting that people have put the jitney sign on their cars coming to work in the morning and again on their way home in the evening. They have actually carried passengers, much to their own profit and the satisfaction and comfort of the passengers carried. It has been a mutual advantage which in the eyes of a certain class of legislators is a contemptible, detestable, pernicious thing, to be suppressed by every lawful means. When no lawful means can be found the law must be changed to provide some. If the city lawmakers had only been wise enough to do nothing with regard to the jitneys for a few weeks the street railway managers would have seen the necessity of meeting the public convenience and would have wisely abandoned the policy of stinting the service and forcing the nuisance of overcrowding. Competition, the great regulator, would work a transformation.56
The "great regulator," however, was not to be allowed to take its proper course. Attempts by the jitney operators to establish a formal bus service in the city were not accepted by City Council, which feared that the TRC would sue the City if competition was permitted to violate the street railway company's monopoly. Moreover, by virtue of the franchise 55 The Evening Telegram, October 23, 1915, 17 , in an article entitled "Jitneys are Dropping Off," reported that the restrictions were: 1) all passengers must have a seat, 2) maximum load set at seven, 3) no smoking in the cars, 4) all owners must take out a $1,000 insurance policy, 5) each year owners must purchase jitney, cab, and chauffer licenses. Needless to say, the net effect of these regulations was to greatly reduce the profitability of jitney operation. agreement between the TRC and the City, the former was compelled to pay 58 a specified portion of its gross revenues to the latter.
The City thus had a vested interest in protecting the monopolistic features of the street railway franchise. In the end, unfair legislation, timidity on the part of civic leaders, and the poor cold weather performance of the jitneys themselves combined to ensure their virtual disappearance 59 by the middle of autumn.
Even before the failure of the jitneys, however, the disadvantaged citizens of Toronto's north end were seeking other remedies to their transportation woes. In this regard, the North Toronto Rate- The Charter of the TRC, 16, prescribed that the company pay to the City the following percentages of gross revenues:
8% of the first $1,000,000, 10% of the next $500,000, 12% of the next $500,000, 15% of the next $1,000,000, 20% of all gross revenues in excess of $3,000,000. During its franchise, the TRC paid the City more than $14 million according to this schedule. Fully forty-five per cent of this amount was paid out after 1914. The rigidity of this formula and a fixed fare combined over the length of the franchise to make the profit picture in later years less impressive than it might have been under unregulated market conditions. 59 "Only Eleven Jitneys Now on Yonge Street," Globe, November 24, 1915, 9.
For an account of these activities see "Get Control of Yonge Street," Evening Telegram, August 11, 1915, 11 and "Deputation to City Hall," Evening Telegram, September 1, 1915, 6 . A full record of the activities of this organization can be found in the "Minutes of the North Toronto Ratepayers 1 Association," MS, Ellis Family Papers, Ontario Archives. For a discussion see Daniel J. Brock, "The Genesis and Demise of a Secession Movement within a Twentieth Century Metropolitan Centre: A Case Study of Toronto, Canada," unpublished term paper , Department of Geography, University of Toronto, April, 1971; "North Toronto Nears End of Its Patience," Globe, September 27, 1915, 7; "North Toronto Folk Talk of Seceding," Globe, October 11, 1915, 7; and "An Uprising in the North,"letter to the editor, Star, December 29, 1915, 5 . The Minutes out early in 1916 after the TRC had complied with the ORMB directive to 61 provide service along the Yonge Street gap.
It remains, however, as an example of the extreme lengths to which some citizens were willing to go in their search for transit relief.
The lengthy overcrowding case, three major investigations (all critical of the TRC), and the Yonge Street affair had all served to point out the shortcomings of Toronto's transit system. Increasingly, as in the earlier case of hydro-electric power, people had begun to question the wisdom of private ownership of a utility designed to serve the general public. The Star noted that private ownership has in nothing so clearly revealed its motive as in the trolley business. It is out to make money. In the trolley business private ownership is not content to take the fat with the lean -it wants to make money not only on the annual service, but it gets down to minute details and aims to give only such service as will make money every day, every hour, and on each journey that every numbered car makes. A car shed is like a livery stable. The vehicle stays in the barn unless its use is paid for.... The trolley is still indispensable, but private ownership of it has been a failure."2
Hope for the future came to be associated with the public take-over of the transit system. This issue of public ownership was finalized by a plebiscite held in 1918. On January 1st, by a ratio of 11 to 1, Torontonians voted in favour of the public take-over of the street of the North Toronto Ratepayers' Association reveal that a motion to secede was discussed at meetings held by that organization on September 21 and 25 and October 9, 1915. No action, however, appears to have been taken on the motion.
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According to "Black Eye for the City. Railway Gets Yonge Street," Evening Telegram, September 11, 1915, 15 , the order to the TRC was issued on that day, with the company given until December 1, 1915 to put the extension into service. Typically, this was not done until early in 1916. During the interval, an estimated ten to fifteeen thousand people daily trudged along the Yonge Street gap. 62 " Trolleys and Jitneys," Star, April 28, 1915, 6 . For a thorough discussion of the public electric power movement in Ontario see H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849 -1941 (Toronto, 1974 railway network upon the expiration of the TRC 1 s franchise in 1921.
The TRC waited more than a year to respond. In an obvious last-ditch attempt to save its franchise, the company proposed a scheme called "Service at Cost." Under this plan, the private owners would continue to own the system, but,as in France and Germany, the directions as to its operations and expansion would come from the City. Fares would be geared to pay the costs of operation and improvements, and to give the 64 owners a return of six per cent on their investment.
The citizens, however, had had their fill of private ownership. There was to be no retreating from the 1918 decision and by 1920 Toronto Transportation Commission had been established by an act of the Provincial Legislature to oversee the shift to public ownership. In September of 1921, Toronto's street railway became a public utility.
Much work was needed to get Toronto's transit system into shape in the years after the public take-over. Among other things, the Toronto Transportation Commission scrapped more than 400 of the obsolete TRC cars, purchased 575 new cars, totally rebuilt 57 miles of single track (more than one third of the system), and extended services into the newer areas of the city by building new lines and consolidating the existing radiais with the rest to the system (Figure 3 ). In addition, feeder bus lines were inaugurated in those areas where the population density was not sufficient to support a car line. Funds for those improvements were raised through the issuance of municipal debentures, a process authorized by the legislation that created the TTC.
The Toronto transit problems of the early twentieth century
were the result of a number of interrelated factors. Most certainly they were precipitated by the refusal of the operators of the private company to extend service beyond the 1891 city limits and to do anything, in spite of considerable judicial, legislative, and public pressure, to improve the quantity and quality of the service offered on existing routes. No doubt the war made improvements difficult, but the service had begun to fail the public long before 1914. And all the time that the transit riders suffered, the owners of the TRC made a fortune. As one editorial writer put it the Toronto Street [sic] Railway Company has fought the city on every clause of its contract that was designed to ensure the rights of the passengers and the public generally, and the result is that if the strap-hanging population of Toronto could find other means of conveyance they would not worry very much about the loss of business to the company. 67
But if most of the blame must fall on the private operators of the street railway system, at least they were true to the goals of capitalism. Civic officials, on the other hand, did not always act with such consistency. The purchase deal, for example, was probably not in the best interests of the citizens. Certainly the way in which its proponents tried to speed its implementation was somewhat irregular, given the vast sum involved. Tommy Church carefully guarded the public purse in this matter, but he showed little regard for the plight of the ordinary transit rider when he carried out his late night raid on the usually opposed anything tending to aid in a solution to the transportation problem, that they frequently took unreasonable attitudes in contesting these attempts at a solution, railing at the board when it failed to adopt the same attitude and that they threw the whole blame on the board or the railway company for delays for which they were chiefly responsible. 68
Clearly, the street railway was not the only exploiter of the public interest.
The persistence of streetcars and the vitality of the mass transit system today combine to make Toronto unique among North American cities. To a large degree, both of these factors owe their existence to the timing of the public take-over of mass transit in Toronto. Had after the public take-over of the system $50 million had been expended in the pursuit of this goal. Indeed, compared to other Canadian cities, the growth of Toronto's street railway network was outstanding (Table 3 ). The stake in public transit was too high for Torontonians to adopt another course. And since most of the money had been expended on the street railway network, the trolley was also assured of a place in the mass transit future of Toronto.
"City Officials Stupid Before Railway Board," Globe, November 12, 1915, 7. 69 McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, [190] [191] Toronto Transportation Commission, Ten Years of Progressive Public Service J.9 21-19 31 (Toronto, 1931) , n.p. For some comparisons see Herbert W. Blake, The Era of Streetcars and Interurbans in Winnipeg, 1881 to 1955 (Winnipeg, 1974 Calculated from figures in Canada, 1931 (Ottawa, 1933 
